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Abstract
The structure of the law of the sea is at times explained as a contestation and coordination of 
the coastal states and the international community. However, such an assumption should not be 
taken for granted and it is necessary to clarify the significance and limitations of its integrity and 
universality.  For this purpose, this paper sheds the light on on cases of incidents at sea caused 
by non-parties of UNCLOS and empirically studies the cases of Turkey, Venezuela and Iran, 
where they undertake harassing or provocative actions against foreign ships and installations. It 
will then briefly consider the significance and limits of the theories of law of the sea. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the codification of the law of the sea went through the mile-
stone First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I), 
Myres McDougal and William Burke presented on how the concept of the 
freedom of seas generated a tension between “inclusivity” and “exclusivity” 
in questions of the claim to ocean space and its use.1 Inclusive interests are 
those that are shared by the international community; this concept holds that 
the law of the sea should be constructed to support common use of an area so 
that a mutual benefit is shared among states. In contrast, exclusive interests 
are asserted by individual states against the rights of other states. This con-
testation of inclusivity and exclusivity remains a basic framework for under-
standing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).2 
The treaty itself contains several mechanisms to resolve this contestation by 
securing its integrity and its universal application. 
First, the Convention takes a zonal approach, whereby the instrument al-
1  Myres Smith McDougal and William T Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary Inter-
national Law of the Sea (Yale University Press, 1962), p. 51-52.
2  United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS]. 
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locates maritime jurisdictions depending on zones demarcated by the distance 
from the baselines of coastal states.3 
Second, member states may conclude agreements modifying or suspend-
ing the operation of the Convention, only when “such agreements do not relate 
to a derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the 
object and purpose of the Convention,” and “such agreements should not af-
fect the application of the basic principles embodied therein.4 ”
Lastly, the Convention requires norms to be applied equally between all 
states. No reservations or exceptions may be made to UNCLOS unless ex-
pressly permitted.5 It has specific provisions on rights of land-locked states,6 
cooperation of states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas,7 and the rights 
of coastal states in ice-covered areas8; but in general, it requires all the coastal 
states to uniformly comply with the rules under the convention.9 
When the coastal states make “excessive” exclusive claims by exceeding 
the limits of the sea,10 it is explained, from a normative perspective, that the 
claims will converge to the rules of UNCLOS, both in its spatial and substan-
tive dimension. Scholars consider that the law of the sea will develop so as to 
integrate the whole maritime domain into one regime. The idea was supported 
by Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal before the South China Sea case, where it held 
that “the text and context of the Convention11” are “clear in superseding any 
historic rights that a State may once have had in the areas that now form part 
of the [EEZ] and continental shelf of another State12” (emphasis added). 
In the context of international legal studies in general, the notion of uni-
versalism has been criticized as a disguise of European or Western interna-
tional law. On the contrary, academics of the law of the sea tend to give greater 
recognition to the inclusive interests of states when a legal question arises.13 
3  Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, 2nd ed. (Hart, 2016), pp. 14-5.
4 UNCLOS, Article 311(3).
5  UNCLOS, Article 309. 
6  UNCLOS, Articles 124-132. 
7  UNCLOS, Article 123.
8  UNCLOS, Article 234. 
9  Rothwell and Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, note 3, pp.14-5.
10  For a comprehensive research on the claims that exceeds the rules of the UNCLOS, see J Ashley Roach 
and Robert Smith, Excessive Maritime Claims, 3rd ed. (Brill, 2012).
11  The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Award 
of 12 July 2016, para. 247, available at: https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/.  
12  Ibid.  
13  Rothwell and Stephens, The International Law of the Sea, note 3; Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and 
the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2011); Natalie Klein, “Maritime Security” in Donald Roth-
well (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 2015). But for the critiques 
against such assumption, see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in a TranscivilizationalWorld 
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However, such assumption should not be taken for granted. It is partly 
because of the undeniable fact that law of the sea scholarship is largely based 
on liberal principles. It requires the coastal states to refrain from making ex-
cessive claims, and thus restricts the exclusivity. It should be noted that it does 
not necessary imply inclusivity either. The argument to limit the coastal states’ 
rights may in the end support the claims of maritime users who possess naval 
powers. It should be noted that these studies have been led by researchers 
largely from maritime powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia.14 Considering this potential structural bias, the literature’s em-
phasis on universal inclusivity has to be taken with caveats.
Hence, it becomes necessary to clarify the significance and limitations of 
law of the sea and to test its potential for inclusivity. As a part of an empiri-
cal study for this purpose, this paper focuses on cases of incidents at sea that 
were informed by specific regional tensions and histories. The term “incidents 
at sea” refers here to a harassment or otherwise provocative action taken on 
behalf of a state to foreign ships, including the warships and vessels of coast 
guards of a foreign government, and installations such as oil rigs. Cases are 
increasing in which a regional power takes such actions against neighboring 
countries’ fishery vessels, ships conducting maritime scientific research, and 
even coast guard vessels. Against this background is the increase of undelim-
ited area after the creation of EEZ and the redefinition of the continental shelf 
under UNCLOS. 
It is not difficult to see that there are certain patterns among these cases. 
They often take place where the maritime boundary line has not been drawn, 
although in some cases the incidents occur in the jurisdictional water of a 
state. There are often plenty of natural resources at play, which could be both 
living and non-living, or the area may be a navigational chokepoint. In addi-
tion, it is normal that states in the region disagree about territorial sovereignty 
either over islands or coastal fronts that generate the maritime jurisdictional 
columns.  
The coercive actions are usually of low-intensity. There are case where 
no weapons are used at all. The examination whether it constitutes the use 
of force prohibited under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations is 
requires a case-by-case analysis in the light of multiple elements concerning 
the actual measures. First, whether there is a minimum threshold of gravity to 
qualify as “force” has to be considered. If one takes an affirmative position and 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp.125-6.
14  McDougal and Burke, The Public Order; Daniel Patrick O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power, 
(Naval Institute Press, 1975). For more recent works, see James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International 
Maritime Security Law (Brill, 2013).
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the force exceeds the threshold, then there are several elements to consider, 
including the gravity of the measures taken and the existence of an intention 
to compel a state’s policy against another state, although there seems to be no 
scholarly consensus on these criteria.15 The harassing states take advantage of 
this potential gap when they take coercive actions against foreign ships. 
Much study has been done on such practices caused by Russia and China 
against neighboring or rivalry countries. On the other hand, less attention has 
been paid to regional mid-powers. In particular, there are cases where non-
parties of UNCLOS cause troubles with their neighboring countries to ex-
pand its influence in the region. UNCLOS enjoys quasi-universal ratification 
among coastal states, but some have not yet ratified it, and maritime disputes 
over natural resources are the very reason why a coastal state would choose 
to not be party (Table 1). In such a situation, the role of UNCLOS is quite 
limited. As a treaty, it does not oblige a third party to comply with its obliga-
tion including the ones for the compulsory dispute resolution mechanism; and 
the instrument does not touch on the issue of territorial disputes. However, 
questions arise whether and to what extent law of the sea has been relied upon 
to prevent conflict and promote international cooperation; and what role UN-
CLOS has played in such a context, if any. 
In order to empirically search the responses to these questions, the next 
section will go through case studies of incidents at sea caused by non-parties 
of UNCLOS (Section II). It will pick up cases where at least one of the state 
parties that took provocative actions is not the party to UNCLOS. While the 
history of each dispute is complicated, it will briefly summarize the character-
istics of each case based on the published facts as of May 2020. Following the 
evaluation of these cases, the last part will analyze the gaps between the as-
sumptions made of the law of the sea and the unresolved issues demonstrated 
by the case studies. (Section III).
15  See Patricia Jimenez Kwast, “Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: Reflections on the 
Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of Guyana/Suriname Award,” Journal of Conflict & 
Security Law 13 (2008); Olivier Corten, The Law against War : The Prohibition on the Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law (Hart, 2010); Atsuko Kanehara, “The Use of Force in Maritime Security 
and the Use of Arms in Law Enforcement under the Current Wide Understanding of Maritime Security,” Ja-
pan Review 3, p. 35, available at: https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/japanreview/pdf/JapanReview_Vol3_No2_05_
Kanehara.pdf.
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Table 1 Members of United Nations and Non-Parties of UNCLOS
Signed but Not Ratified Neither Signed nor Acceded
































Source: “Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the re-
lated Agreements,” available at: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_rati-
fications.htm. accessed on 16 July 2020.
II. REGIONAL MARITIME DISPUTES: CASE STUDIES
A. TURKEY—EAST MEDITERRANEAN SEA
The first case is the measures Turkey has taken against foreign vessels 
exploring over the continental shelf in the East Mediterranean Sea.16 Turkey, 
Syria and Israel have not signed UNCLOS, and Libya has signed but not rati-
fied it (Table 1) 17. Among these non-parties of UNCLOS, Israel is a state party 
16  For the overview of the dispute, see Ilias Kouskouvelis and Kalliopi Chainoglou, “Against the Law: 
Turkey’s Annexation Efforts in Occupied Cyprus” Hague Yearbook of International Law 29 (2016), p. 55, 
2016; International Crisis Group, Turkey and Greece: Time to Settle the Aegean Dispute, Europe Briefing 
N°64, Istanbul/Athens/Brussels, 19 July 2011; Nikos Tsafos, “The United States in the East Med: A Case 
Study in Energy Diplomacy,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2019, available at: https://www.
csis.org/analysis/united-states-east-med-case-study-energy-diplomacy; Constantinos Yiallourides, “Part I: 
Some Observations on the Agreement between Greece and Egypt on the Delimitation of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone,” 25 August 2020, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/18969-2/.
17  This paper will not delve into disagreements between Greece and Turkey at Aegean Sea, which is another 
important precedent regarding undelimited areas in the law of the sea. 
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to the Continental Shelf Convention. All of the states have established their 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and declared their continental shelf.18 
Turkey helped to establish Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
in 1983. Regardless of the denouncement by UN General Assembly, Turkey 
has provided financial and military support to TRNC since then and has pro-
vided infrastructure investment offered by Turkish private companies.19 Tur-
key has an overlapping maritime area with Cyprus, Greece and Egypt. It also 
claims that TRNC is the only legitimate entity to exercise its sovereign rights 
over the domain surrounding the whole Cyprus island.20 Table 2 shows the list 
of maritime delimitation agreements in this region and the objections from 
other states. 
In the early 2010s, a series of large gas fields including Leviathan field and 
Aphrodite field were found in the area. The coastal states—notably Israel and 
Cyprus—started to exploit them, propelled by capital from the United States. 
Turkey, claiming its ab initio and ipso facto rights over its continental shelf, 
began by granting hydrocarbon exploration licenses to the Turkish Petroleum 
Corporation (TPAO) in an overlapping maritime area with both Greece and 
Cyprus. Turkey has claimed that its conduct is justified because TRNC is en-
titled to sovereign rights over the EEZ and continental shelf generating from 
the whole Cyprus island. Turkey has also contended that the offshore license 
granted by Cyprus to the developers “bears no legal effect on Turkey’s ipso 
facto and ab initio sovereign rights over its continental shelf for the purposes 
of exploration and exploitation of its natural resources.21” Turkey completed 
the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) in 
2018, which connects the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan with Europe, 
creating potential for the gas from the Levantine Sea to be exported to Europe 
and the natural resources from the region will accelerate its use.  Cyprus and 
Greece have contended that, because TRNC territory is illegally occupied by 
Turkey and the entity does not have the status as a State, it is not the capacity 
to exercise rights over the resources. 
In the meantime, the Turkish navy started to harass ships licensed by or 
registered to Cyprus within Cyprus’s jurisdictional water (Table 3). Until 
early 2014, the incidents took place in an overlapping area that both TRNC 
18  For the relevant agreements, see “Maritime Space: Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation,” avail-
able at: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/asia.htm. 
19  Kouskouvelis and Chainoglou, “Against the Law,” p.58.
20  See the maps published by Turkish government. “Maritime Delimitation & Offshore Activities (Presen-
tation -10 May 2019),” available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/maritime-delimitation-_-offshore-activities--_
presentation-10-5-2019.en.mfa. 
21  A/68/759, Letter dated 13 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
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and Cyprus claimed. In fall 2014, however, Turkey started to conduct seismic 
and drilling activities and to harass ships licensed by Cyprus in areas that 
the TRNC did not even claim. Furthermore, Turkey prevented foreign energy 
companies licensed to drill for gas and oil from accessing Cypriot waters in 
2018.22 At this stage, Turkish President Erdogan was reported to have stated 
in the Turkish Parliament that: “[w]e advise the foreign companies who are 
conducting activities off Cyprus, relying on the Greek side, not to be an instru-
ment to businesses that exceed their limit and power.23” 
The European Union (EU) has called on Turkey to cease its provocative 
actions and to respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus. In response to the in-
cident in 2018, EU Commission stated that “Turkey needs to commit itself 
unequivocally to good neighborly relations and to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, having recourse, if necessary, to 
the International Court of Justice.24” The EU urged Turkey “to avoid any kind 
of threat or action directed against a Member State, or source of friction or 
actions, which damage good neighborly relations and the peaceful settlement 
of disputes.25” The EU has repeatedly underlined that negative statements that 
damage good neighborly relations should be avoided. In July 2019, EU issued 
a statement that Turkey’s plan for exploitation off Cyprus is “of grave concern 
and an unacceptable escalation of tensions surrounding the Mediterranean is-
land.26” 
On 14 January 2019, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMFG) was 
founded. On 7 August 2019, Greece, Israel, Cyprus and the United States 
agreed to enhance cooperation in the energy sector27; and on 2 January 2020, 
Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed an accord to build the Eastern Mediterra-
nean pipeline, connecting the field to Greece via Cyprus.28 Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia took part on the side of Cyprus, Greece and Egypt to counter Turkey.
To counter these moves, Turkey and Libya’s Government of National 
22  Kouskouvelis and Chainoglou, “Against the Law,” p.85.
23  Ibid, p.96.
24  President Juncker, Parliamentary Questions-Answers, 30 January 2018 (Question reference: 
E-006460/2017), available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/.  
25  Ibid.
26  European Council, “Turkish drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Council adopts conclu-
sions,” available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/15/turkish-drilling-
activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-council-adopts-conclusions/.
27  “Joint Statement on the Ministerial Meeting of the U.S., Greece, Republic of Cyprus, and Israel Re-
garding Cooperation in the Field of Energy,” 7 August 2019, available at: https://cy.usembassy.gov/joint-
statement-on-the-ministerial-meeting-of-the-united-states-greece-republic-of-cyprus-and-israel-regarding-
cooperation-in-the-field-of-energy/.
28  “EastMed Gas pipeline agreement signed at trilateral summit between PM Benjamin Netanyahu, Greek 




Accord (GNA) concluded a maritime delimitation agreement on 27 Novem-
ber 2019.29 Turkey also promoted the pipeline projects TurkStream and Nord 
Stream II, which will enable the transfer of natural gas from Russia to Turkey 
through Turkey and the Baltic Sea. Not only the EU and Israel but also the 
United States was against these plans.
There is no sign of a peaceful dispute settlement for this situation. The fact 
that Cyprus and Egypt accepted International Court of Justice (ICJ)’s compul-
sory jurisdiction under ICJ Statute Article 36(2) is hardly relevant when the 
other states have not done so.30 Cyprus officially invited Turkey to address 
the maritime delimitation between the relevant coasts of Cyprus and Turkey 
before ICJ only in vain.31 
It is notable that Turkey relies on rules provided by UNCLOS. It does not 
rely on unknown concepts to UNCLOS, and it does not emphasize regional 
interests or other bases of regional international law. However, the states that 
are involved in this dispute do not show any signs that they are bound to the 
obligation of self-restraint. 
In a broader framework, this dispute is a part of the tension between Tur-
key’s intension to expand its regional power, Russia’s interests in accessing 
the Mediterranean Sea, and the political and economic concerns of the United 
States and the EU. In June 2019, Turkey purchased a Russian anti-aircraft 
S-400 missile system notwithstanding its membership to NATO. On 10 June 
2020, a Turkish warship targeted a French frigate with a radar as the French 
vessel approached a Tanzanian-flagged cargo ship. France was acting on intel-
ligence from NATO that the civilian ship could be involved in trafficking arms 
to Libya as a part of the alliance’s operation, Sea Guardian. The United States’ 
involvement was under the general banner of energy cooperation, but it has 
also been a geo-economic counterweight to these rising powers.32 It should 
not be noted that China has expanded its Belt and Road Initiative to the East 
Mediterranean Sea. In this situation, which has become a proxy conflict for 
global super-powers, law of the sea has only a limited role to promote inter-
national cooperation.  
29  Since 2015 to this date, Libya is in the midst of an armed conflict mainly between GNA and Libyan 
National Army (LNA) and the ceasefire has not been achieved. GNA has been an interim government for 
Libya based in Tripoli that was formed in an initiative led by United Nations in 2015. However, despite the 
creation of GNA, Libyan House Representatives (LHR), a faction based in Tobruk, refused to cooperate 
and the two parties broke off. The UN and EU has recognized GNA as a legitimate government, while Rus-
sia, Egypt and United Arab Emirates (UAE) supported LHR.
30  Cyprus, 3 September 2002, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations/cy; Egypt, 22 July 1957, https://www.
icj-cij.org/en/declarations/eg. 
31  A/74/660-S/2020/50, Letter dated 20 January 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
32  Tsafos, “The United States in the East Med”
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Table 2 The List of Maritime Delimitation Agreements




















Lebanon, claiming that it 
infringes Lebanon’s EEZ 














A Joint Statement by 




Note: There exists Cyprus-Lebanon EEZ delimitation agreement of 2007 but it 
has not entered into force as Lebanon opposed to Cyprus-Israel agreement of 2010.43 
33 Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the Delimitation of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, 17 February 2003, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION-
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/EGY-CYP2003EZ.pdf.
34 Law of the Sea Bulletins Vol. 54, p.127.
35 Agreement between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 2740 UNTS 55.
36 A Letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 14 July 2011.
37 The text of the agreement is available in Turkish at https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/es-
kiler/2012/10/20121010-3-1.pdf.
38 Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s statement regarding 
Turkey’s submission of a Note Verbale to the UN concerning the delimitation of its continental shelf with 
the pseudo-state,” 25 May 2020.
39 European Council meeting, 12 December 2019, EUCO 29/19, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/41768/12-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf.
40 “Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, France, Cyprus and Greece - Final Communiqué, Cairo,” 8 
January 2020, available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/egypt/news/article/meeting-of-
the-foreign-ministers-of-egypt-france-cyprus-and-greece-final.
41 Ibid.
42 Letter dated 13 November 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General.





Table 3 Incidents at East Mediterranean Sea




27-Apr-12 Turkish government grants hydrocarbon explora-
tion licenses to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation 
(TPAO) in a maritime area which significantly 
overlaps with Cyprus and Greece.  
Cyprus44
Greece45 
4-Jun-13 A seismic vessel Ramform Sovereign (registered 
to Singapore, owned by the Norwegian company 
Petroleum Geo-Services and licensed to perform 
seismic surveys in Cyprus EEZ) was harassed by 
the Turkish navy.
Cyprus46 
25-Jul-13 A research vessel RV Odin Finder (registered to 
Italy, licensed by Cyprus) was conducting a survey 
in the south-west part of Cyprus’ EEZ for install-
ing an undersea cable system, its activity was ob-
structed by the Turkish Navy and it was forced to 
leave the area.
Cyprus47 
5-Sep-13 Turkey issued a navigational warning announcing 
the launch of seismic survey operations from 5 
September to 18 November 2013 in an area which 
includes part of Cyprus’s EEZ and continental 
shelf.
Cyprus48 
22-Nov-13 Turkey issued navigational warnings to conduct 
seismic surveys in Cyprus’s territorial sea, EEZ 
and continental shelf. A seismic vessel Barbaros 
Hayreddin Paşa (owned by TPAO), escorted by 
Turkish frigate Gokceada, conducted the seismic 
operation scheduled for a month.
Cyprus49 
44 A/66/851, Letter dated 15 June 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General.
45 Note Verbale to United Nations Secretary General, 20 February 2013, available at https://www.un.org/
Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/communications/grc_note_20022013_re_tur.pdf.
46 A/68/537, Letter dated 17 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Na-
tions addressed to the Secretary-General.
47 A/68/593–S/2013/662, Letter dated 12 November 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General.
48 A/68/555–S/2013/634, Letter dated 29 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary General.
49 A/68/644–S/2013/720, Letter dated 5 December 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
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12-Dec-13 Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa conducted seismic sur-
vey operations in an area partly falling within the 
territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf sched-
uled for a month.
Cyprus50 
3-Oct-14 Turkey issued a navigational telex by which it des-
ignated certain areas for the purposes of seismic 
survey. The areas are designated for hydrocarbon 
exploration and exploitation operations on behalf 
of Cyprus. 
Cyprus51 
20-Oct-14 Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa, accompanied by two 
other support vessels, carries out a seismic survey 
in Cyprus’s EEZ. 
Cyprus52 
17-Oct-15 Turkey constructed a subsea water pipeline con-
necting Turkey and TRNC.
Cyprus53 
17-Dec-15 A Turkish navy vessel approached and harassed 
the vessel MV Flying Enterprise (registered to and 
lisenced by Cyprus to conduct a geophysical sur-
vey in its EEZ) in Cyprus’s EEZ.
Cyprus54 
25-Aug-16 Flash Royal (registered to Cyprus) was harassed 
twice by a frigate of the Turkish Navy, TCG Geli-
bolu, when it was conducting marine scientific re-
search for Cyprus with respect to cetacean species. 
Turkey claimed that the location of the research 
was within Turkish continental shelf.
Cyprus55 
10-Oct-16 Turkey and TRNC agreed to establish an electric-
ity connection and to collaboration on a range of 
other issues, such as oil, natural gas and renewable 
energy.
Cyprus56 
50 A/68/759, Letter dated 13 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
51 A/69/582, Note verbale dated 13 November 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
52 A/69/425, Letter dated 6 October 2014 from the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General.
53 A/70/780–S/2016/228, Letter dated 8 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
54 A/70/767–S/2016/201, Letter dated 17 March 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
55 A/70/1032, Letter dated 6 September 2016 from the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General.
56 A/71/611–S/2016/955, Letter dated 10 November 2016 from the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
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6-Apr-17 Cyprus granted offshore license for its continental 
shelf, where Turkey claims that the area belongs to 
TRNC’s continental shelf.  
Turkey57 
16-Aug-18 Turkish patrol vessels harassed and prevented a 
fishing vessel Maria Bouboulina (registered to 
Cyprus) from carrying out scheduled fishing ac-
tivities; and arrested the vessel. Cyprus claims that 
it occurred in the high seas, while Turkey claimed 
that it occurred in the territorial sea of TRNC.
Cyprus58 
26-Jan-19 Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa and supporting vessels, 
accompanied and supported by Turkish warships, 
commenced seismic surveys in the southern conti-
nental shelf/EEZ of the Cyprus in the area which 
was reserved via a navigational warning. Some of 
the blocks have been assigned to Eni and Total.
Cyprus59 
9-Feb-19 Five Turkish navy stopped and harassed Saipem 
12000, a drill ship licensed by Cyprus to operate 
in Cyprus’s EEZ.60 
4-May-19 A drilling vessel Fatih of TPAO, accompanied 
by warships, was deployed within the continental 
shelf/EEZ of Cyprus and remains there at a dis-
tance of about 36 NM from Cyprus.  
Cyprus61 
8-Jul-19 A drilling vessel Yavuz of TPAO, accompanied by 
warships and supporting vessels, was deployed 
within the territorial sea of Cyprus, approximately 
10 NM south of Karpasia Peninsula. Cyprus issued 
an arrest warrant of the vessel.62 
Cyprus63 
57 A/71/875–S/2017/321, Letter dated 12 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
58 A/73/406, Letter dated 1 October 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Na-
tions addressed to the Secretary-General.
59 A/73/753–S/2019/160, Letter dated 19 February 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
60 Renee Maltezou, “Cyprus accuses Turkey of blocking ship again in gas exploration standoff,” Reuters, 
23 February 2018.
61 A/73/944–S/2019/564, Letter dated 11 July 2019 from the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
62 “Cyprus issues arrest warrants for Turkey drill ship crew,” Reuters, 14 June 2019.
63 A/73/944–S/2019/564, Letter dated 11 July 2019 from the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
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15-Nov-19 Yavuz conducted the drilling operation in blocks 
which Cyprus assigned to Total and Eni.
Cyprus64 
Note: This table only shows Turkey’s provocative actions over maritime re-
sources and do not include other disputes over foreign vessels.
B. VENEZUELA—CARIBBEAN SEA
The second case is Venezuela’s conducts in the Caribbean Sea, mainly 
its coercive actions against Guyana. Several of the coastal states in Central 
America are not the parties to UNCLOS. As listed in Table 1, Colombia and 
El Salvador signed the convention but not have ratified it. Peru and Venezuela 
have not signed the convention. Caribbean Sea is a geographically complicat-
ed area, and several maritime boundary cases went through third-party dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
Venezuela has enjoyed one of the largest oil reservoirs in the world and 
is one of the original members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) since 1960. However, the failed economy under the presi-
dencies of Hugo Chávez from 1999 to 2013 and Nicolás Maduro from 2013 to 
the present has allowed poverty and inflation in the country to increase. In the 
meantime, Guyana contracted with ExxonMobil in 1999 to explore the Sta-
broek block and Demerara area, which lies off the shore of the coast disputed 
with Venezuela. In 2015, the company discovered massive oil reservoirs off 
Guyana, which experts now believe to be the next largest field in the region. 
This has led a series of incidents between Venezuela and Guyana.65 
Against this background is the territorial dispute over Essequibo land (Es-
equiba), located in the west Essequibo River, which is currently under the 
control and administration of Guyana. Venezuela is a former colony of Spain 
and Guyana, of the Netherlands and later the United Kingdom. Venezuela 
achieved its independence from Spain in 1811 and split from Great Colombia 
in 1830, after another war of independence from 1810 to 1823. After its final 
independence, Venezuela claimed Essequibo land, which was adjudicated by 
an international tribunal in 1899 in favor of Britain.66 Since 1962, Venezuela 
has claimed that the award was invalid. Guyana achieved its independence in 
1966. The countries disagree about the attribution of the coast and therefore 
64 A/74/549–S/2019/881, Letter dated 13 November 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
65  See British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Report on the Obligation of States under 
Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS in Respect of Undelimited Maritime Areas, 2016, p.54.
66  Award regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, 
3 October 1899, 28 RIAA 331.
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have not been able to reach an agreement on maritime boundaries. In 1956, 
Venezuela issued a decree establishing a 99-mile long straight baseline clos-
ing the delta of the Orinoco River, which Guyana rejected as far as it covered 
the disputed area.67 In 2011, Guyana filed an extended continental shelf sub-
mission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS),68 
against which Venezuela objected.69 On 29 March 2018, Guyana requested 
that the ICJ confirm the legal validity and binding effect of the 1899 Award, 
which is now pending.70
There have been a number of incidents arising from Venezuelan objec-
tions to hydrocarbon licensing by Guyana in the waters off the coast.71 In 
October 2013, the Ocean Patrol of the Bolivarian Navy Guard, the Venezuelan 
coast guard, seized M/V Teknik Perdana, a Panamanian-flagged seismic sur-
vey vessel. The vessel was contracted by the US company Anadarko Petro-
leum Corporation and was operating under a Guyanese license to search for 
hydrocarbons in the Roraima block offshore Guyana. MV Teknik Perdana’s 
crew explained that they were conducting a multi-beam survey of the seafloor 
in Guyana’s EEZ, but the ship’s captain was charged with violating Venezu-
ela’s EEZ.72
This incident raised tensions, as the diplomatic effort to resolve the situa-
tion was unsuccessful. Venezuela’s actions have been condemned by the Ca-
ribbean Community (CARICOM) and the United States. However, Venezuela 
continued naval surveillance of the disputed area, which slowed oil explora-
tion activities in the region. 
In 2015, Venezuela issued Decree No. 1787, which expands the outer lim-
its of Venezuela’s EEZ to include areas off the coast of Essequibo and Demer-
ara that lie within Guyana’s claimed EEZ.73 Besides Guyana, Suriname, Trini-
dad and Tobago, Barbados’ EEZs are affected by this measure.74 One of them 
covered the area which extended from the Promontory of Paria to the border 
67  Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Baselines: National Legislation with Illustrative Maps, 
No. E.89.V.10, at 381. A illustrative map is available at United States Department of State, Limits of the 
Seas, No. 11, 11 June 1970, at 4; J Ashley Roach and Robert W Smith, note 6, p.122.
68  CLCS.57.2011.LOS, 7 September 2011, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submis-
sions_files/submission_guy_57_2011.htm. 
69  The People’s Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 9 March 2012, avail-
able at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_guy_57_2011.htm. 
70  Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela), Application instituting proceedings, filed in the 
Registry of the Court of 29 March 2018.
71  BIICL, note 35, p.54.
72  Ibid, p.55.
73  Decreto N° 1.787 del 26 de mayo, Gaceta Oficial N° 40.669, 27 de mayo de 2015, available at: http://
www.tsj.gob.ve/gaceta-oficial. 
74  See the map at CARICOM, “Statement on the Decree 1787 of Venezuela,” 7 July 2015, available at: 
https://caricom.org/statement-on-the-decree-1787-of-venezuela-guyana-venezuela-border-dispute/.
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shared with Trinidad and Tobago and covered the disputed maritime area be-
tween Venezuela and Guyana. Guyana objected to this decree as a “flagrant 
violation of international law.75” This decree was replaced by Decree 1.859 in 
2015, which authorized its navy to operate in Operational Zones for Integral 
Maritime and Island Defense (ZODIMAIN).76
There are also reports of incidents in areas off the coast of Guyana. For 
instance, the Canadian mining company Goldfields reported on 23 October 
2015 that it had received a notification from Venezuelan authorities warning 
of legal action over its operations in the Aurora mine located in Guyana’s 
disputed Essequibo maritime region. Furthermore, on 22 December 2018, 
Venezuelan naval units tried to board ExxonMobil exploration ships, under 
license from Guyana in its territorial waters. The exploration ships refused 
Venezuela’s request and escaped to undisputed Guyanese waters.77  
Besides Guyana’s baseline claim to the same area, it is difficult to assess 
if Venezuela’s Decree No. 1787 per se is excessive because the EEZ claimed 
by Venezuela does not go beyond the 200 nautical miles (NM) limit from the 
baseline. Venezuela’s claim over the disputed area is partly based on its rejec-
tion of the 1899 awarding of that land to Guyana. However, there is no sign 
that such a contention is the basis of a regional norm and there is no sign that 
Venezuela considers the obligation of self-restraint. 
Guyana worked on other members of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
and the organization issued a statement to “reiterate its firm, long-standing 
and continued support for the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Guyana.78” However, Venezuela is not a member of this organiza-
tion so that the resolution does not do much against it. Furthermore, most of 
CARICOM’s members are also members of Petrocaribe, an alliance whose 
members purchase oil from Venezuela at reduced costs, so that Venezuela 
maintains its political power vis-à-vis those neighboring states.
In a larger context, the United States has supported Guyana to enhance its 
naval equipment by, for instance, donating three speedboats in 2014 as part 
of Washington’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).79 On the other 
75  Ibid. 
76  Decreto N° 1.859 del 6 de jullio de 2015, Gaceta Oficial, N° 40.696, available at: http://www.tsj.gob.
ve/gaceta-oficial. 
77  Neil Marks, “Canada’s Guyana Goldfields says notified of possible Venezuela claim,” Reuters, 23 Octo-
ber 2015, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/guyana-gold-venezuela/canadas-guyana-goldfields-
says-notified-of-possible-venezuela-claim-idUSL1N12N1BO20151023
78  CARICOM, “CARICOM Community Issues Statement in Support of Territorial Integrity of Guyana,” 
20 March 2015, available at: https://caricom.org/caricom-community-issues-statement-in-support-of-terri-
torial-integrity-of-guyana/. 
79  CBSI started in 2010 and its members include small countries in the region, namely, Antigua and Barbu-
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hand, Venezuelan Navy has been upgraded during Maduro’s regime such that 
the disparity between the military forces remains. Against this background, 
there is no sign that Venezuela and its neighboring states cooperate for the 
maritime security in the region.
C. IRAN—PERSIAN GULF
The third case is Iran’s actions in the Persian Gulf, which is one of the 
world’s largest oil fields. Iran remains a signatory to UNCLOS (Table 1). 
It has concluded maritime boundary agreements with Bahrain,80 Oman,81 
Qatar,82 Saudi Arabia,83 and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).84 Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia agreed on the boundary in 2000.85 There has not been an agree-
ment between Iran and Iraq, nor between Iran and Kuwait. Iran is also disput-
ing the territorial title over islands in the Gulf – the Greater Tunb, the Lesser 
Tunb, and Abu Musa – with the UAE. 
Since the early 2010s, Iran has undertaken provocative actions in the area 
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Typically, two or three Iranian military 
boats approach an operating rig within Kuwait and Saudi’s water and threaten 
it or otherwise harass it (Table 4). The other two countries protested that the 
area exclusively belongs to them and that such actions could lead to confron-
tations that could threaten security and peace in the region. Iran responded 
that it did not “recognize any claim of sovereign rights to the resources of the 
seabed and its subsoil in the divided zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
(former neutral zone) until and unless its maritime border in this area is delim-
ited.” In 2016, it further stated that the action took place where the boundaries 
of the EEZ between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have not yet been delim-
ited, and the Iran reserves its rights to continue its activities under the interna-
da, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, 
St Kitts and Nevis, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Belize, Haiti and 
other Caribbean islands such as Montserrat and the Dutch islands are observers. It does not include Ven-
ezuela and Colombia. For U.S.’s support to Guyana through this program, see “Caribbean Basin Security 
Initiative: Guyana,” https://www.state.gov/caribbean-basin-security-initiative-guyana/. 
80  Agreement concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Iran and Bahrain (signed 17 June 
1971, entered into force, 14 May 1972).
81  Agreement concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Iran and Oman , (signed 25 July 
1974, entry into force 28 May 1975); Agreement on the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Sea 
of Oman between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman (signed 26 May 2015, entered 
into force 4 September 2016).
82  Agreement concerning the boundary line dividing the continental shelf between Iran and Qatar (signed 
on 20 September 1969, entered into force 10 May 1970).
83  Agreement concerning the sovereignty over the islands of Al-’Arabiyah and Farsi and the delimitation 
of the boundary line separating submarine areas between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran, (signed 24 
October 1968, entered into force 29 January 1969).
84  Offshore Boundary Agreement between Iran and Dubai (signed 31 August 1974).
85  For the maritime situation in this region, see Masahiro Miyoshi, “The Joint Development of Offshore Oil 
and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation,” Maritime Briefing, Vol. 5(2), 1999, p.6.
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tional law of the sea.86 Iran has also objected against Saudi Arabia’s baseline.87 
It does not seem that Iran is claiming a regional norm or concepts un-
known to UNCLOS as justification for its actions. However, Iran has not ex-
pressed its intention to refrain from further coercive actions.
Furthermore, as the tension between Iran and the United States increased 
in the late 2010s, there has been a series of provocative actions both by and 
against Iran. Most recently, on 13 June 2019, two non-Iranian tankers were 
damaged by explosions in the Gulf of Oman. Iran denied its involvement, but 
the United States immediately pointed Iran.88 From July to November of the 
same year, the UK Royal Navy frigate HMS Montrose had almost daily con-
frontations with Iranian forces, with interactions for 115 times in the Persian 
Gulf.89 Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has taunted the warship, 
which failed to prevent the seizure of a tanker that remains in Iranian custody. 
The Iranians have also reportedly sent drones and fast attack craft within 200 
meters of the warship, as well as targeted the frigate with missiles. 
On 11 October 2019, an Iranian-owned oil tanker, Sabiti, was attacked 
in the Red Sea, about 60 miles off the coast of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Then, 
on15 April 2020, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said 11 small vessels 
belonging to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy conducted “dangerous 
and harassing approaches” toward a fleet of American ships, including the 
USS Lewis B. Puller, an expeditionary mobile base vehicle, and the USS Paul 
Hamilton, a destroyer. These actions were not taken as a part of maritime 
claims by coastal States in the region but in a larger context of the political 
tensions. There is no sign that the parties will now proceed to a peaceful dis-
pute resolution. 
86  A/71/694, Note verbale dated 27 December 2016 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
87  A/67/762, Letter dated 20 February 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. 
88  Megan Specia, “U.S. Navy Says Mine Fragments Point to Iran in Tanker Attack,” New York Times, 19 
June 2019.
89  David D. Kirkpatrick, “‘If You Obey, You Will Be Safe’: Audio Emerges of Iran and U.K. Exchanges 
Before Tanker Is Seized,” 21 July 2019, New York Times; Royal Navy, “Royal Navy Safeguards Nearly 90 




Table 4 Incidents at Persian Gulf
Date of the inci-
dents
Incidents Objections
10-Aug-2011 Two armed Iranian boats threatened the 
workers at the sight of Al-Durra well in 
the Saudi/Kuwaiti oil field.
Kuwait, Saudi Ara-
bia90 
11-Aug 2011 Two Iranian boats approached at the 




25-07-2012 An Iranian helicopter spun several times 
above the rig drill site in the region of 
Al-Hasba field. 
Saudi Arabia92 
26-07-2012 Two Iranian military boats intercepted 
and stopped a boat of one of the Saudi 
ARAMCO’s contractors in ARABIA 
field area. 
Saudi Arabia93 
24-Aug-2012 Three armed speed boats flying the Ira-
nian flag crossed into the submerged Ku-
waiti-Saudi zone adjacent to the divided 
zone. They stopped near a drilling rig for 
several minutes and proceeded towards 
the vessel assisting the rig.
Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia94 
24-Oct-2012 Three armed Iranian vessels approached 
a drilling rig in the Durrah field and 
stopped alongside the handling vessel. 
Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia95 
90 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Joint Note Verbale dated 15 December 2011. All the letters and memorandums 
listed in Table 4 are available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATE-
FILES/IRN.htm.
91 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Joint Note Verbale dated 15 December 2011.
92 A/67/593, Letter dated 19 October 2012 by United Nations, 19 October 2012.
93 Ibid.
94 A/67/593, Letter dated 21 November 2012 from the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
95 A/67/691, Letter dated 8 January 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
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Iranian vessels made incursions to Saudi 
Arabian maritime zone in the Marjan 
oilfield against the prohibition of Saudi 
Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia96 
20-Apr-2016 A support vessel and two speed boats 
flying the Iranian flag, each with three 
armed personnel aboard, approached a 
well in the Durrah oilfield in the Saudi 
Arabian-Kuwaiti submerged divided 
zone.
Saudi Arabia97 
21-Apr-2016 An Iranian Hendijan-class support ves-
sel (Hendijan 1401) approached a well 
in the Durrah oilfield in the Saudi Ara-






Iranian ships and boats in the waters of 
Saudi Arabia in the protected zones of 
oil fields located in the territorial waters 
and EEZ of Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia99 
Note: This table only shows Iran’s provocative actions over maritime resourc-
es and do not include other disputes over foreign vessels.
96 Saudi Arabia, Note Verbale transmitted on 16 December 2015.
97 A/71/375, Letter dated 8 September 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.
98 Ibid.
99 A/73/212, Note verbale dated 5 July 2018 from the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 




These brief analysis of three cases of incidents at sea caused by non-par-
ties to UNCLOS shows that the assumption of integrity and universality of 
law of the sea has certain limits.  It is no longer the question whether the ha-
rassing power makes an excessive claim in the light of the rules of UNCLOS 
because it is not that these states – in the present case, Turkey, Venezuela and 
Iran – rely on the zones that are unknown to UNCLOS to take coercive mea-
sures against foreign vessels. 
These disputes occur because of factors which are beyond the maritime 
legal order. When disputes over land territory have to be resolved first, as in 
the case of the East Mediterranean Sea and the Caribbean Sea—although the 
status of TRNC and claims of Venezuela have been defined by international 
organizations as described above—, law of the sea plays even a limited role. 
In addition, all of the regional cases have confrontations between global pow-
ers as a background, so that no integration is expected to happen. 
  The present paper thus concludes that the assumptions that has been 
taken in the studies of law of the sea should be relied upon with a caveat. This 
does not mean at all that the idea of integration and universality has to be dis-
carded. UNCLOS was adopted in a belief that the codification and progressive 
development of norms will contribute to “the strengthening of peace, security, 
cooperation and friendly relations among all nations” in conformity with the 
principles of justice and equal rights.100” It is essential to acknowledge that 
measures taken by a particular state are decided based on political, economic, 
and social imperatives. Studies on law of the sea should take into account 
these elements when assessing maritime security from the perspective of its 
own discipline. 
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